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SYMPOSIUM
THE URUGUAY ROUND AND




The round of multilateral trade negotiations convened by
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)' in 1986
in Punta del Este, Uruguay (Uruguay Round) was the most am-
bitious of the eight rounds of negotiations convened since the
creation of the GATT. The Uruguay Round, like its predeces-
sors, seeks to continue the lowering of tariffs and customs barri-
ers which historically have been the most prevalent and signifi-
cant impediment to international trade. More importantly, the
Uruguay Round seeks major progress in the reduction of
nontariff barriers, the strengthening of GATT as an institution,
and the broadening of the coverage of the GATT which has
eluded previous negotiators.
I. THE SCOPE OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
The scope of the Uruguay Round redefines the nature of in-
ternational trade negotiations and the nature of issues falling
under the auspices of the GATT. The Uruguay Round and its
related negotiations address tariff reductions, rules of origin, an-
tidumping law and procedure, subsidies and countervailing du-
ties, safeguards, voluntary restraints, market access for the prod-
ucts of lesser developed countries, trade in tropical products,
reform and elimination of the quota system for textiles, liberali-
zation of trade in steel, liberalization of agricultural trade, gov-
ernment procurement, trade related intellectual property mea-
sures, trade related investment measures, trade in services, the
institutional structure of GATT, the functioning of the GATT
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1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
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system, and.dispute resolution mechanisms.2
The ambitiousness of these negotiations is all the more ap-
parent when viewed against the background of the historical and
institutional weaknesses of the GATT as a pale reflection of the
more powerful international trade institutions contemplated by
the victorious Allies in creating the post World War II economic
order.3 Nonetheless, the GATT has been successful in achieving
binding tariff reductions on a multilateral basis, but has enjoyed
much more limited success in addressing other evolving issues of
trade liberalization.
The structure and operation of the GATT make further
changes difficult to accomplish. Amendment of the GATT is no
longer a feasible option.4 Continued trade liberalization has
come through the negotiation of multilateral codes which them-
selves fit awkwardly into the framework of obligations contem-
plated by the GATT.5
The continuing ambivalence of the United States towards
multilateral trade liberalization through the GATT has further
complicated this process. It was the hostility of the United
States Congress which prevented the creation of a comprehen-
sive International Trade Organization (ITO) in the first place.6
The failure of the ITO forced the international trading commu-
nity to use the GATT as both a set of rules and an institution
when it was never intended to play this dual role.
As the years passed, Congress authorized the President to
negotiate in the GATT rounds with various degrees of enthusi-
asm. Congress often granted specific authority to negotiate for a
set period of time, specified negotiating objectives, and required
ongoing dialogue with the Congress and the private sector re-
garding the status and outcome of the negotiations.'
2. See Other Documents, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Ministerial
Declaration on the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 25 I.L.M. 1623
(1986) (declaration of goals and framework for Uruguay Round). See generally AMERICAN
BAR AsS'N, URUGUAY RouND TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
(1991); Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holner, The Uruguay Round: Where are We?, 25
INT'L LAW. 723 (1991).
3. See generally KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION (1970); JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969)
[hereinafter JACKSON, WORLD TRADE].
4. See GATT, supra note 1, Art. XXX.
5. See John H. Jackson, The Birth of the GATT-MTN System: A Constitutional
Appraisal, 12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 21 (1980).
6. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 3, at 49-53.
7. See, e.g., Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-35 (1982) (negotiating objectives
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Of key importance to United States credibility and negoti-
ating effectiveness has been the willingness of the Congress to
authorize the President to negotiate for a set period of time to
conclude international trade agreements which Congress would
then consider on an expedited basis, with limited debate, no
possibility of filibuster, and without amendments.8 Under this
so-called "fast track" procedure, Congress may only vote on the
package of trade agreements as a whole.9 Any agreements con-
cluded after the deadlines established by Congress could always
be tendered to the Congress for implementation through normal
Congressional procedures, but would presumably fail under the
weight of debate, filibuster, amendment, and special interests.10
Against this background, the United States came to the table at
the Uruguay Round with a mandate to negotiate under the fast
track as long as any resulting agreements were presented to the
Congress by March 1991.
II. THE PROGRESS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
Since the initial ministerial meeting in 1986, progress has
come slowly in the Uruguay Round. The 1988 midterm meeting
in Montreal is credited with increasing the political will of the
Contracting Parties to continue the process of multilateral trade
liberalization. However, the Montreal meeting produced only a
few tangible results."
The negotiations intensified as the Contracting Parties ap-
proached the 1991 deadline for the expiration of the fast track
procedure under United States law. Ultimately, the deadlines
under United States law passed without agreement in Geneva.
and limits for the Tokyo Round).
8. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 102, 2503, 2903 (1988).
One of the principal failings of the 1967 Antidumping Code was the negotiation of
the code by the Executive Branch without any explicit delegation or authorization by
Congress, which subsequently refused to implement the Code to the extent it was incon-
sistent with existing United States law. See Russell B. Long, United States Law and the
International Anti-Dumping Code, 3 INT'L LAW. 464 (1969).
9. 19 U.S.C. §§ 102, 2503, 2903.
10. The impending expiration of the fast track for the United States appears to
have been one of the principal stimulants for the conclusion of the Tokyo Round of
GATT negotiations in 1979.
11. The 1988 meeting did produce agreement regarding the strengthening of dispute
resolution proceedings under Article XXImI of the GATT and the creation of a new
Trade Policy Review Mechanism. See Kenneth W. Abbott, GATT as a Public Institu-
tion: The Uruguay Round and Beyond, 18 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 31 (1992) [hereinafter
Abbott].
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The issue of agricultural subsidies alone proved to be the princi-
pal impediment to agreement and compromise across the full
range of trade issues under consideration." The talks then went
into hiatus as the world trading community waited to see if the
Congress would reauthorize the fast track and permit the Presi-
dent to reopen credible negotiations at the international level.
As a result of the eventual extension of the fast track13 and
the tireless efforts of the GATT Secretariat and its Director-
General, Arthur Dunkel, 4 the negotiations resumed in earnest in
the late summer of 1991. By November of 1991, the framework
of agreements was approaching completion, although ultimate
success was still very much in doubt.
III. BEYOND THE URUGUAY ROUND
Regardless of the final outcome of the Uruguay Round, both
the GATT and United States international trade law and policy
will not stand still. The GATT has yet to finish the process of
the elimination of the tariff as a barrier to international trade.
In order to achieve true multilateral trade liberalization on a
global scale, important sectors of the world economy must be
permanently brought within the framework of GATT discipline
and its pillars of binding tariff reduction,' 5 most favored nation
treatment,16 national treatment,17 and the host of rules designed
to prevent evasion of these fundamental principles.
The GATT appears to be in the middle of its next great
struggle over the regulation and elimination of the many
nontariff barriers which have arisen in place of the tariff. Since
12. See Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Talks Tops U.S. Trade Agenda for
1991 as Administration, Congress Also Prepare to Deal With Range of Other Issues, 8
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 60 (Jan. 9, 1991) [hereinafter Uruguay Round]; The Other
Brinkmanship, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 5, 1991, at 34.
13. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 143 (1992) [hereinafter Koh).
14. See Time is Running Out, Dunkel Warns Uruguay Round Negotiations, 8 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1404 (Sept. 25, 1991); Trade Ministers Express Optimism on Timely
Conclusion to Uruguay Round, 8 Int'l Trade Rep, (BNA) 1492 (Oct. 16, 1991); Talks
Will Reach Decisive Phase in October and November, Dunkel Says, 8 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1148 (July 31, 1991); Uruguay Round, supra note 12; Draft GATT Agreement
Offered By Dunkel Draws Mixed Response; Talks To Continue, 9 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 38 (Jan. 1, 1992); Uruguay Round Talks To Last Until Spring As U.S., EC Voice
Reservations on Draft, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 98 (Jan. 1, 1992).
15. GATT, supra note 1, Art. II.
16. GATT, supra note 1, Art. I.
17. GATT, supra note 1, Art. III.
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the Kennedy Round of negotiations in the 1960s, the GATT has
sought to address these problems. Few nontariff barriers have
been eliminated outright. However, nontariff barriers have been
identified and defined with greater specificity, and remedies
have been created and harmonized for countries affected by the
nontariff barriers of their trading partners. The code system was
the outcome of the Tokyo Round's efforts to define the legiti-
mate countermeasures available to contracting parties injured by
nontariff barriers and other practices deemed unfair by the in-
ternational trading system.18
The Uruguay Round has continued in this tradition and is
unlikely to prohibit or eliminate outright these most elusive of
trade barriers. The multitude of nontariff barriers must eventu-
ally be eliminated as a substitute for the tariff barriers that the
GATT has already so successfully addressed. Much work will re-
main for the GATT in future rounds.
Finally, the GATT has barely begun to address the social
aspects of trade policy. The interplay between trade and envi-
ronmental issues will undoubtedly be the subject of intense po-
litical debate in the United States and elsewhere, and will con-
tinue to be raised in ongoing disputes before the GATT. 9 The
next round of GATT negotiations will be the first available fo-
rum to reach a more comprehensive resolution to this pressing
global issue. The interaction between competition and interna-
tional trade policy remains another topic of intense scholarly in-
terest,20 and already has been suggested as a fitting topic for fu-
18. See, e.g., Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 171
(26th Supp. 1980) [hereinafter GATT Antidumping Code]; Agreement on Interpretation
of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 56 (26th Supp. 1980) (Subsidies
Code); Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade, GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DocuMENTs, 116 (26th Supp.
1980) (Customs Valuation Code); Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, GATT,
BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 8 (26th Supp. 1980) (Standards Code);
Agreement on Government Procurement, GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED
DOCUMENTS, 33 (26th Supp. 1980).
19. United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Report of the Panel, GATT
DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991) (holding United States ban on tuna caught in manner endanger-
ing marine mammal life to be violation of GATT rules against quantitative restrictions
in international trade).
20. See SPENCER WEBER WALLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAW
(1992); MARIO MARQUES MENDES, ANTITRUST IN A WORLD OF INTERRELATED ECONOMIES
(1991); ORGANISATION FOR Eco. COOPERATION AND DEV., COMPETITION AND TRADE POLI-
CIES: THEIR INTERACTION (1974).
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ture GATT rounds.21 The final stage in the evolution of GATT
will have to include the consideration of the full social costs of
trade liberalization including competition, environmental, labor,
immigration, and cultural barriers to trade, and the other short
term and long run dislocations experienced in national econo-
mies exposed to international trade.
These issues will also be played out in the United States as
it confronts the full impact of international trade in its domestic
market. The United States faces, on an ongoing basis, the choice
of whether its national interests can best be served through a
long term commitment to a system of multilateral trade liberali-
zation through the GATT or if it should seek to achieve its na-
tional interests elsewhere.
IV. THE SYMPOSIUM
After more than five years of negotiations in the Uruguay
Round and an end in sight (one way or another), the time was
ripe for an assessment of past efforts, predictions for the future,
and, most importantly, analysis of how the Uruguay Round had
already shaped and changed the way the international commu-
nity and the United States look at GATT and the future of
world trade. On November 15, 1991, a unique symposium was
convened at Brooklyn Borough Hall to address both the interna-
tional and domestic effects of the Uruguay Round.2 2 The sympo-
sium was a cooperative effort of Brooklyn Law School, the
Brooklyn Journal of International Law, the Brooklyn Law
School Center for the Study of International Business Law, the
American Society of International Law (ASIL)23 and the Inter-
national Economic Law Interest Group of the ASIL.
The thesis of the symposium was deceptively simple. Al-
though as yet uncompleted, the Uruguay Round already has ex-
erted a present influence over the multilateral regulation of in-
ternational trade through the GATT and the national regulation
of international trade in the United States. The continuing ne-
gotiations in Geneva have shaped the way the international
21. Commission Analyzes Problems Posed in Post-Uruguay Round Era, 8 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1405 (Sept. 25, 1991).
22. A debt of gratitude is due Brooklyn Borough President Howard Golden for the
use of the spectacular restored Beaux-Arts ceremonial courtroom in Brooklyn Borough
Hall which was the site of the symposium.




trade community thinks about the GATT, the scope of interna-
tional trade issues, whether the struggle for multilateral trade
liberalization is worth continuing, and whether the GATT
should be the institutional framework for that effort.
The ongoing and unresolved Uruguay Round also has
shaped United States trade policies. The United States has
made a strong political commitment to negotiate a North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico,
and to continue embryonic efforts to extend such a free trade
area throughout the entire Western hemisphere, either as an al-
ternative, or as a supplement, to further multilateral liberaliza-
tion through the GATT. 4 The need for an extension of the
President's fast track negotiating authority to complete the ne-
gotiations at the Uruguay Round, and to commence the NAFTA
talks, led to a bruising political confrontation between the exec-
utive and the legislative branches, resulting in the extension of
the President's fast track negotiating authority, for both the
Uruguay Round and NAFTA, through 1993.5
The morning session of the symposium focused on the ef-
fects of the Uruguay Round on the future of GATT as the prin-
cipal institution for the multilateral regulation and liberalization
of international trade. Professor John Jackson of the University
of Michigan Law School opened the symposium with his paper
GATT and the Future of International Trade Institutions."
Professor Jackson argues that "governments need to pay as
much attention to the institutional structure of the GATT sys-
tem, as they pay to the substantive measures in the GATT" if
the GATT is to continue to play its important and constructive
role in the field of international economic relations. 7 Professor
Kenneth Abbott of Northwestern University School of Law con-
tinued with his paper GATT as a Public Institution: The Uru-
guay Round and Beyond, 8 analyzing the continuing evolution of.
the GATT in fresh terms of the public and private interests
served by the GATT. Professor Abbott applied this framework
24. The Administration explicitly linked the Uruguay Round and the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement negotiations by seeking the extension of the fast track au-
thority for both negotiations as a package.
25. Now the 1992 Presidential election also looms on the horizon, making trade lib-
eralization even more prominent as a political issue.
26. 18 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 11 (1992).
27. Id. at 28.
28. Abbott, supra note 11, at 31.
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in highlighting and analyzing the tangible results of the Uruguay
Round arising out of the 1988 Montreal agreements modifying.
and streamlining the dispute resolution provisions of the GATT
and the functioning of the GATT system.29
The morning session continued with two distinguished com-
mentators, each uniquely qualified to discuss the international
effects of the Uruguay Round from his own national and re-
gional perspectives. Peter McKellar, of the Canadian Consulate
General in New York City, offered his comments on the
NAFTA, which may emerge as a major regional alternative to
further multilateral trade liberalization." Richard Wright, the
Counsellor for Trade and Commercial Affairs for the Delegation
of the Commission of the European Communities, provided his
commentary from the vantage point of the European Communi-
ties, a key player in both the Uruguay Round negotiations and
in regional arrangements to complete and expand the European
common market.31
The symposium continued with the luncheon remarks of
William B. Barreda, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Trade
and Investment of the United States Department of the Trea-
sury. Mr. Barreda shared with the symposium the up to the
minute developments of the Uruguay Round negotiations, in
which he serves as one of the principal negotiators for the
United States government.
Mr. Barreda's remarks formed a natural bridge to the after-
noon session, which focused on the effect of the Uruguay Round
on United States international trade law and policy. Professor
Ronald A. Brand, of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law,
presented his paper, GATT and the Evolution of United States
Trade Law, in which he traced the ongoing links between the
GATT and United States international trade law and policy. 2
Professor Brand's paper was a continuation of his longstanding
interest and work in the interaction between these two bodies of
law, despite the domestic political and constitutional forces
which often place the United States at odds with the interna-
29. Abbott, supra note 11, at 31.
30. Peter McKellar, NAFTA and the GATT: A Regional Perspective on the Uru-
guay Round, 18 BRooKLYN J. INT'L L. 87 (1992).
31. Richard Wright, The European Community's View of the Uruguay Round: A
Brief Perspective, 18 BfooKLYN J. INT'L L. 95 (1992).
32. Ronald A. Brand, GATT and the Evolution of United States Trade Law, 18
BRooKLYN J. INT'L L. 101 (1992).
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tional community on trade issues.3 3 Professor Harold H. Koh of
the Yale Law School then presented his paper on The Fast
Track and United States Trade Policy, placing both the Uru-
guay Round and the NAFTA negotiations in the context of the
continuing struggle between the United States Congress and the
President for supremacy in the field of international economic
relations, and the necessary accommodations between both
branches in order to negotiate and implement international eco-
nomic agreements within the framework provided by the United
States Constitution. 4
The commentators for the afternoon panel brought a wealth
of governmental and private practice experience to bear on the
effects of the Uruguay Round on United States import relief
laws. Gary N. Horlick, of O'Melveny & Myers in Washington,
D.C., discussed the continuing efforts to adopt a new multilat-
eral antidumping agreement which would modify and improve
the implementation of the existing GATT antidumping provi-
sions,35 the 1979 Antidumping Code,3 6 and the impact of the
newly proposed code on United States antidumping law and
procedure.3 Robert Leo, of Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks & Schill
in New York City, then offered his comments on the effect of
the Uruguay Round and the NAFTA on the substance and prac-
tice of United States customs and international trade law. 8
The papers and comments from the symposium deserve
preservation and promulgation to the widest audience possible.
They represent lasting contributions to the literature and juris-
prudence of the GATT and United States international trade
law. Therefore, the Brooklyn Journal of International Law, the
cosponsors of the symposium, and all the participants are
pleased to present this special symposium issue - The Uruguay
Round and the Future of World Trade.
33. See Ronald A. Brand, The Status of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade in United States Domestic Law, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 479 (1990).
34. Koh, supra note 13, at 143.
35. See GATT, supra note 1, Art. VI.
36. See GATT Antidumping Code, supra note 18.
37. Gary N. Horlick, Proposals for Reform of the GATT Antidumping Code, 18
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 181 (1992).
38. Robert J. Leo, Practicing International Trade Law After the Uruguay Round,
18 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 189 (1992). Mr. Leo is the former Vice President and Counsel of
the American Association of Exporters and Importers.
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